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Background
Black holes can occur in packet-switched networks that use distance-vector route calculation algorthms such as tier routing. This section briefly reviews tier routing and defines new terms relevant to black * holes.
Tier Routing
Packet radios use tier routine [1]. a variation on distance-vector routing. to maintain routes to all radios in a non-hierarchical network or to all radios in the same cluster in a hierarchical network. Each radio's routing table contains an entry for each destination packet radio-the entry contains the following information:
* * The destination packet radio D, * The reporting packet radio ID * Hop count to the destination.
U
Each packet radio periodically broadcasts a Packet Radio Organization Packet (PROP) to all of its neighbor radios, listing its distance to every destination as stored in its routing table. Neighbor packet radios update their routing tables to incorporate shorter routes described within this PROP. For example (Figure 1 .1), if radio X advertises a 3-hop route to radio Z. and radio Y is radio X's neighbor whose route to Z is 5 hops (dotted lines), radio Y will update its route when it hears X's PROP. Radio Y's new route to Z (dashed lines) will be 4 hops long and will have X as its reporting PR. Using this route. Y will forward all packets en-route to Z via neighbor radio X. 
Black Holes
A black hole is a packet radio whose PROPs contain false hop-count information for certain destination radios. In Figure 1 .2. if radio B correctly implements the tier-routing algorithm. its PROPs will state that it is n hops from 0. But, if B is a black hole, its PROPs may state that its distance to D is only k hops, where 2 < k < n. Although a black hole could claim that it is just one hop away from many destinations, a network management system can easily detect this 'lie" by noticing that these destinations do not list the black hole as a good neighbor.
,D It is likely that the false routes reported by the black hole's PROPs will be shorter than many of the correct routes known by the black hole's neighbors for the same destinations. Consequently, when neighboring radios receive the black hole's PROPs, they will update their routing tables and forward much of their traffic to the black hole. As this mismformntion spreads throughout the network, much of the traffic created near the black hole will be sucked in toward the black hole, causuig two problems. First. because the black hole's neighbors' routing tables contain bad routes, they repeatedly forward packets back to the black hole, and many packets never reach their destinations. Second, the excessive amount of traffic forwarded to the black hole causes it to be,.ome a traffic boitianek. and volume of traffic drawn into the black hole will vary with the number of destinations it lied about and the amount by which the distances were understated. Congestion around a black hole can persist despite the radios' adaptive routing algorithms. As congestion increases around the black hole, packet collisions increase, link qualities decrease, links between the black hole and its neighbors are dropped, new routes are found, and traffic is rerouted around the black hole in minutes or less. However, as the traffic around the black hole decreases. collisions will ,hen decrease. link qualities will increase, links will be brought back up, and the black hole will again attract excessive traffic, causing congestion and delay.
Not only do packet radios report routing information to neighbors in PROPs, they report it to network management systems in MDP2 [2] packets as well. A consistent black hole reports the same information in its PROPs and its %fDP2 packets. For example, if B is a consistent black hole. its M.DP2 will report that it is k hops from 0. An inconsistent black hole reports greater distances in its MPD2 packets than in its PROPs. For example. if B is an inconsistent black hole, its MDP2 might report that it is k + 2 hops from radio 10 instead of k hops. as reported within its PROPs. An inconsistent black hole might tell a different lie to the network management system to try to avoid being detected by a consistent black hole. Although an inconsistent black hole could report lower values of distances to destinations in its MDP2 packets than it reported in its PROPs, we do not view this kind of lying to be a threat.
A black hole successfully lies to a neighbor if the neighbor updates its routing table to incorporate false short routes reported bv the black hole's PROP. In our example. B successfully lied to C. and it itored k+ I as the distance and B as the reporting PR for its route to radio D. Since PROPs are broadcast in a single packet, a black hole must tell the same lie to all of its neighbors, but whether or not the lie successfully causes a neighbor to incorporate a false route depends upon the contents of the neighbor's routing table. In practice, we expect black holes to lie aggressively and lie successfully to most if not all of their neighbors.
A black hole lies through a neighbor by claiming that neighbor as the reporting PR for a false route in its MDP2 packet. In our example, radio B has lied through radio A if its MDP2 states that B's route to D is k hops long and that radio A is the route's reporting PR. A black hole can cause many false routes to be propagated throughout the network by lying through one. some. or all of its neighbors.
By definition, radio Y has a routing- In the next section we outline an algorithm for detecting black holes that compares the suspected black hole's table against each of its acighbors' and compares each of the neighbors' tables agaiast the suspected black hole's. The number of SBH => NBR (suspected-black-hole-to-neighbor) discrepancies 
I
The Black.Hole-Detection Algorithm Section 2.1 provides an overview of our black-hole-detection algorithm, which analyzes MDP2 packets from packet radios for routing discrepancies. Section 2.3 lists the type and number of discrepancies that will occur, depending upon whether or not the suspected black hole and/or its neighbors are black holes. Our algorithm correctly detects black holes if several assumptions can be made about the packet-radio network. Section 2.2 describes those assumptions. Section 2.4 describes our decision criteria that use the assumptions in Section 2.3 to classify a suspected radio based upon the routing discrepancies found between it and its neighbors.
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Our algorithm accepts as input the ID of a packet radio that has been suspected of being a black hole. We imagine that a network operator or another module within the network management system might suspect the radio of being a black hole and then invoke the black-hole-detection algorithm to confirm or reject the suspicion. Our algorithm determines whether or not a suspected radio is a black hole by comparing its routing table with those of its neighbors and detecting specific patterns of inconsistency. Our algorithm has five steps: 1 1. Accept as input the ID of a packet radio suspected of being a black hole.
2. Query the suspect and its neighbors for MDP2 packets containing their routing information. 5. Apply the decision criteria described in Section 2.4 to classify the suspected radio as an OK radio. a consistent black hole. or an inconsistent black hole.
Routing Table Discrepancies
I
This section describes the number of SBH => NBR and NBR =: SBH routing table discrepancies that will exist for a suspected radio, depending upon whether the suspect is an OK radio, a consistent-black-hole, or an inconsistent black hole. 
Suspect is an OK Packet Radio
A suspected OK packet radio will have an NBR :> SBH discrepancy with each neighbonng consistentblack-hole radio that has lied through it. For example, in Figure 1 .2, let's assume that: I * B is suspected of being a black hole but is an OK packet radio, and e C is a consistent black hole that has lied through radio B by reporting B as the reporting PR for I its false route to D.
C's distance to D reported in its Mv[DP2 will appear too low when compared to B's distance to D. Consequently, a network management system will find an NBR :: SBH discrepancy for suspected packet radio B with radio C. A suspected OK packet radio will have an SBH -> NBR discrepancy with each inconsistent neighboring black hole that has lied to it. For example, in Figure 1 .2. let's assume that: * B is suspected of being a black hole but is an OK packet radio, e A is an inconsistent black hole whose PROP states that A is only k hops from D where 2 < k < B's distance to 0 will appear too low when compared with A's distance to D. Consequently, the network management system will find an SBH :> NBR discrepancy for B with its neighbor radio A.
Suspect is a Consistent Black Hole
If the suspected black hole is consistent, it will contain an SBH => NBR discrepancy with each OK 3 neighbor that the suspect has lied through. For example, in Figure 1 .2, let's assume that * A is an OK packet radio. A suspected consistent black hole will contain an SBH = . NBR discrepancy with each neighboring consistent black hole it has lied through. This case is the same as when the suspect lies through an OK packet radio.
A suspected consistent black hole will contain an NBR =>-SBH routing table discrepancy for each neighboring inconsistent black hole that has lied to the suspect. For example, in Figure 1 .2, let's assume 3that Report No. 7176
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* A is an inconsistent-black-hole neighbor radio that has reported to suspected black-hole radio B that A j m hops from destination 0, m < n -1, * B is a suspected as a black hole and really is a consistent black hole, * Consistent-black-hole radio B has incorporated the false route advertised by A's PROP and reports in its own PROP and MDP2 packet that it is < m + 1 hops away from D, and " Radio A has reported in its MDP2 packet that A is > m hops away from D.
Consequently, B's distance will appear too low when compared with A's distance to D reported in its MDP2 packet.
Suspect is an Inconsistent Black Hole
An inconsistent black hole will have an NBR :> SBH discrepancy with each OK packet radio it has lied to. For example. in Figure 1 .2. let's assume that:
e B is suspected as a biack hble and really is an inconsistent black hole.
9 B reports in its PROP that it is k hops from D. where 2 < k c, n.
* B reports in its NDP2 that is is greater than or equal to k + I hops from D, * E is an OK packet radio, and * B has successfully lied to all of its neighbors.
Packet radio E's MDP2 packet will report a route to D that is k+l hops long through reporting PR B. As an inconsistent black hole. B's MDP2 packet will claim that B is greater than or equal to k + 1 hops from D. Consequently, E's distance to D will appear too low when compared to reporting PR B's distance to D. Radio B will also have an NBR => SBH discrepancy with each consistent black hole it has lied to. This is basically the same case as a neighboring OK packet radio.
The routing discrepancies that may exist between two inconsistent black holes depend upon the details of how the radios have lied in their PROP and MDP2 packets. Table 2 .1 summarizes the discrepancies detected in each of these situations.
Assumptions
Our algorithm descnbed in Section 2.1 correctly classifies suspected radios into OK radios, consistent black holes, and inconsistent black holes if certain assumptions can be made about the packet radio network. Table 2 .1: Routing- Table Discrepancies 1. All routing inconsistencies are caused by black holes
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Our algorithm assumes that all routing inconsistencies are caused by lies told by black-hole packet radios. Routing inconsistencies caused by other factors such as changing network topology can confuse the algorithm. Dependence on this assumption seriously limits the applicability of our algorithm.
There is only one black hole in any local area
It is harder to tell which radios are lying and which are telling the truth as the density of liars increases in a region of the network. Our algorithm assumes that:
" Each OK radio has at most one black hole as neighbor, and " Each black hole radio has only OK radios as neighbors.
Dependence on this assumpuon somewhat limits the applicability of our algorithm. Our algorithm assumes that if a black hole understates its distances to destinations, at least two of its neighbors will incorporate these false routes into their tables. This assumpuon is plausible.
Each black hole successfully lies to at least two neighbors
Decision Criteria
This section describes how the algorithm classifies a suspected packet radio, given the number of discrepancies found between the suspect and its neighbors. If the assumptions described in Section 2.3 are true, tis decision criteria will correctly classify a radio as one of:
3 OK packet radio. 
3
* the suspect is an inconsistent black hole that has lied to an OK neighboring packet radio, or e the suspect is an OK packet radio, but the neighbor is a consistent black hole that has lied through 3 the suspect.
Since we have assumed that each packet radio has at most one neighboring black hole. finding two or more NBR => SBH discrepancies indicates that the suspect is an inconsistent black hole.
Exactly One NBR = SBH Discrepancy
3
We have assumed that every black hole successfully lies to at least several of its neighbors. so we should detect several NBR :> SBH discrepancies, not just one. if the suspect is an inconsistent black hcle. Consequently, detection of just a single NBR = SBH discrepancy leads us to believe that the suspect is an OK packet radio and that the neighbor is a consistent black hole. 
& the suspect is a consistent black hole that has lied through the neighboring OK packet radio, or * the suspect is an OK packet radio, but the neighbor is an inconsistent black hole that has lied to the suspect.
Since we have assumed that each packet radio has at most one neighboring black hole, finding two or 3 more SBH => NBR discrepancies indicates that the suspect is a consistent black hole. 
Exactly One SBH : NBR Discrepancy
If just a single SBH =:: NBR discrepancy exists, we need additional information to disambiguate among the possibilities:
3
* The original suspect is a consistent black hole and the neighbor is an OK p. :ket radio. or
3*
the neighbor is an inconsistent packet radio and the onginal suspect is an OK packet radio.
Let's call the neighboring radio N. If we compare N's routing information to those of its neighbors and count the number of SBH => NBR and NBR :> SBH discrepancies between N and its neighbors. we can obtain the necessary additional information. If N is an OK packet radio (first case). we should see just a single discrepancy between N and the original suspect. If N is an inconsistent black hole tsecond case), we should see several NBR : SBH discrepancies between N and its neighbors. one for each neighbor that N lied to. Table 2 .2 summarizes the decision crteria that classify packet radios based upon the number and type of routing discrepancies found.
Discrepancies Classification
Two or More NBR = SBH Suspect is an inconsistent black hole that has lied to these neighbors.
Exactly Ona NBR = SBH Suspect is an OK radio. Neighbor is a consistent black hole that has lied through the suspect.
Two or More SBH :> NBR Suspect is a consistent Hack hole that has lied through these neighbors.
Exactly One SBH => NBR If the neighbor has more than one NBR :> SBH discrepancy with its neighbors, the original suspect is an OK radio and the neighbor is an inconsistent black hole. Otherwise, the suspect is a consistent black hole that has lied through this j one neighb r. 
